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THE TERM LIMITS DISSENT: WHAT NERVE
Robert F. Nagel

I
Many, if not most, constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court involve
rather ordinary disputes. If they seem for a moment to be connected to
fundamental political ideas, it is only because intellectual hyperventilation is
normal and acceptable in our field.1 But every now and then, as with United
States v. Nixon or Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, the Justices try to signal that a
case is genuinely worthy of the adjective "constitutional." 2 Those signals are all
over U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.3 Both the majority opinion and the
dissent are substantial and detailed. Both appeal in serious ways not only to text,
history, and structure, but also to first principles. Both insist that the
constitutionality of state term limits legislation cannot be determined without

understanding what kind of a nation we are.
At that altitude it is easy to lose your balance, and it is possible to
question whether the Justices were fully in control of their material. In
particular, it is curious that all the opinions dwell on the question whether the
ultimate source of the authority of the Constitution was the people in the states
or the undifferentiated people of the whole nation. This highly abstract issue

I. As an illustration, consider the following passage, which is not from a brief or an op
ed column but from the pages of an eminent scholarly journal:
The structural constitutional logic undergirding temporary immunity applies with
even greater force to the President. Unlike federal lawmakers and judges, the
President is at "Session" twenty-four hours a day, every day. Constitutionally
speaking, the President never sleeps. The President must be ready, at a moment's
notice, to do whatever it takes to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution
and the American people: prosecute wars, command armed forces (and nuclear
weapons), protect Americans abroad, negotiate with heads of state, and take care
that all the laws are faithfully executed. We should hesitate before arming each
citizen with a kind oflegal assault weapon enabling him or her to commandeer the
President's time, drag him from the White House, and haul him before any judge
in America.
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privilegesand Immunities: The Nixon and
Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995). An example closer to the subject matter of
this essay is the extended effort by two serious scholars to show that concern about federalism is
evidence of neurosis. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a
NationalNeurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 passim (1994).
2. In United States v. Nixon, the Court referred to executive privilege as "fundamental
to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in separation of powers under the
Constitution" and evaluated that interest "in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law."
418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974). The plurality opinion in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey purported to
protect "the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law." 505
U.S. 833, 868 (1992).
3. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
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does not seem tightly connected to the question presented by the case.4 The
sovereign people "of the states" could, after all, have agreed to limit their
power to define the qualifications for federal office. Conversely, even assuming
that the people of the nation consented to the Constitution, they could still have
reserved to the states the power to set federal term limits.
Nevertheless, the derivation of constitutional authority may be relevant to
the case in some less exact way, and by the end of this essay I will suggest one
such possibility. My present point is merely that on the whole all three opinions
succeed in linking the specific dispute about term limits to grander themes
about allocation of authority.
Indeed, the Thomas dissent succeeds in this so well that many
sophisticated people are aghast at the implications of his thinking. Jeffrey
Rosen, for instance, wrote that the four dissenters are questioning "the legacy
of Reconstruction," and Linda Greenhouse said that the Court is close to being
"a single vote shy of reinstalling the Articles of Confederation." 5 Laurence
Tribe commented that the Justices are approaching "something radically
different from the modem understanding of the Constitution." 6 Such reactions
might be dismissed as predictable journalistic excesses. They might also be
dismissed as having more to do with Clarence Thomas than with his claims
about federalism. It is no secret that many legal observers have long associated
Thomas with a misguided political ideology and a dangerous jurisprudence. For
such people, Thomas's dissent might have been disturbing in part because it is
such a detailed, methodical, relentless legal argument. 7 It establishes him as an
intellectually formidable presence on the Court.
Nevertheless, it remains a fact that serious commentary treats the Term
Limits dissent as having put something fundamental at issue. Charles Fried's
sober "Foreword" to the Harvard Law Review begins by describing the
opinions of the 1994 Term as "redolent of first principles and revolutionary
gesture." 8 Although generally skeptical about this odor of radicalism, he
concedes that the four votes9in support of Thomas's "initial manifesto" come
"closest to revolutionary." The Justices who joined the majority opinion
apparently perceived in the dissent's position the same kind of potential. They
thought it appropriate to do battle with the notion that this nation is merely "a
collection of states" and to deny that the Congress is a "confederation of
nations."' 0 Similarly, in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy saw fit to rebut the
4.
The question ...- whether the states preceded the creation of the union, or vice
versa-like the riddle of the chicken and the egg, may be entertaining.. .but, in the
end, not especially relevant. The important question is the nature of the federal
Union that emerged when the Constitution was ratified and that has developed
since that time.
DAviD L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 58 (1995).
5. Linda Greenhouse, Focus on FederalPower, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at Al;
Jeffrey Rosen, Terminated,NEW REPUBLIC, June 12, 1995, at 12.
6. Greenhouse, supra note 5.
7. Professor Kathleen Sullivan describes the two major opinions as ending in an
intellectual standoff. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Duelling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995).
8. Charles Fried, Forward:Revolutions?, 109 HARV.L. REV. 13, 13 (1995).
9. Id. at 14-15.
10. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1855 (1995).
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claim that "the sole political identity of an American is with the State of his or
her residence," and to assert that "we are one people, with one common
country."11 All this raises the question: What nerve does the Thomas opinion
touch?
My purpose is to explore that question. I do not intend to defend
Thomas's thinking against charges of radicalism. Indeed, my interest is in
trying to understand his radicalism and to depict it more accurately.
Nevertheless, in a certain sense I will be defending his opinion. My view is that
the dissent is deeply threatening precisely because it challenges a radical
potential in the majority opinion. That potential is not generally acknowledged
to be radical (or decried as dangerous) because it is consistent with nationalistic
political aspirations that are widely shared among sophisticated commentators.
These aspirations are, I think, the nerve that Justice Thomas struck. After
describing the strong nationalism inherent in Term Limits, I will try to show
how the dissent threatens the belief that this form of nationalism is either
realistic or attractive.

II
It should go without saying that there is no chance that Justice Thomas
will lead a successful campaign from the Court to turn this country into a
confederation or to convince any appreciable number of Americans that their
"sole political identity" is with their state governments. On the doubtful
assumption that Thomas intended to pursue such objectives, there are strong
reasons to believe that all the other Justices, including his fellow dissenters, are
ambivalent or dubious about "states' rights" even when the issues are limited or
ordinary.1 2 Far more importantly, the political culture in the United States is
too nationalized to permit any court to alter significantly our identity as a
3
unified nation.1
Now, I recognize that under the norms for debate that govern
constitutional commentary, exaggeration is often taken for granted. It is usually
treated as an unimportant convention or, at worst, a regrettable tactic, and
other explanations for it are not sought. But all of the comments that I have
referred to are expressed in earnest terms, and I doubt that any of the critics
was being intentionally propagandistic. None of the assertions comes from a
person who is uninformed or imprecise. What can account for the existence of
these apparently serious concerns about the revolutionary potential in Thomas's
position?
One kind of explanation that immediately presents itself is psychological.
The critics, it might be hypothesized, have been under stress. They have in
recent years suffered a series of shocks and defeats, including the partial
restoration of the doctrine of state immunity from congressional regulatory
power and the first judicial finding in almost six decades that some activity is
11.

ld.
at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

12. For some of these reasons, see Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten
Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalismand the Original Understanding,94 MICH. L.
REv. 615, 620 (1995). For others, see Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism,46 CASE
W. RES. L. REV.643, 655-58 (1996).
13. See generallyRubin & Feeley, supra note 1, at 944-97.
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outside the commerce power. 14 Also to be taken into account are new statutes
(such as the Unfunded Mandates Act) and proposed bills (such as the various
efforts to "devolve" authority over welfare back to the states). 15 Fears of
confederation, it might be said, are understandable overreactions to these
outrages. Like all psychological explanations, this one is somewhat insulting. It
assumes that a few political setbacks.can cause intelligent, capable people to lose
their grip on reality.
We might, therefore, prefer the conventional doctrinal explanation. This
approach would involve a careful analysis of the logic employed in the Thomas
dissent along with a demonstration that-if extended-that logic would have
various far-reaching consequences. The doctrine of interposition, for instance,
might be shown to follow potentially from the dissenters' view that sovereignty
resides in the people in the states. The difficulty with this as an explanation, of
course, is that all of Thomas's critics (especially the Justices) know that seldom,
if ever, are all the doctrinal implications of an opinion realized. Indeed, as the
cases from National League of Cities to Garcia show, sometimes those
implications are not realized at all.16 Limitations can be imposed because judges
have second thoughts or because of practical realities, but they can also be
imposed because jurists honestly do not agree that their decisions ever did entail
the dire implications that others attribute to them. It is clear, for instance,
that-right or wrong-Justice Thomas does not believe that his view of the
Tenth Amendment must be pushed so far as to threaten the practice of holding
congressional elections. 17
I certainly do not mean to deny, by the way, that there is considerable
amount of potential for expansion in the Thomas position nor that he might
intend to try to realize some of it in future cases. There is virtually no doubt,
for instance, that he would vote to approve other kinds of state-imposed
qualifications. More generally, we know from his opinion in Lopez that
Thomas takes seriously enough the idea that the national government may
exercise only authorized powers that he would invalidate a range of modem
Commerce Clause enactments.18 These two possibilities, like others that I can
imagine, might be thought to be unwise and even radical. But the identification
of such realistic fears only intensifies puzzlement as to why Thomas's critics so
often invoke unrealistic visions of confederation.
A third kind of explanation would begin by insisting that the logical
implications of a judicial opinion are relevant to the terms of public debate

14. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (immunity); United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (commerce power).
15. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995)
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). As of this time, Congress is still considering
welfare reform proposals.
16. For examples of the Court's refusal to extend the doctrine of National League of
Cities v. Usery, see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982). On the limited
significance of New York v. United States, see Robert F. Nagel, Federalism'sSlight Revival,
1993 PUB. INTEREST L. REV. 25.
17. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1898-1900 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
18. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing for abandonment of the "substantial effect" test).
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quite independently of their likely operational consequences. That is, aside from
Thomas's beliefs or intentions and aside from predictions about the other
Justices' probable voting patterns in subsequent cases, the Term Limits dissent
might be "revolutionary" as a set of ideas. Under this view, the critics of the
Thomas dissent are not really trying to stave off confederation; they are simply
trying to win an argument, to defeat a particularly bad idea.
We all know that it is possible to get excited about ideas for their own
sake, so this explanation is a promising one. To the extent that some of the
criticisms are expressed in words, like "reinstalling," that portray the issue as
operational, this might be understood (in the coy phrase Linda Greenhouse
actually did use) to be "a slight exaggeration."' 19 And the ideas or aspirations
that underlie Thomas's dissent may well be fundamentally bad ones. But just as
it is true that Thomas does not actually propose to establish a confederation, it
is also true that at least on its face his opinion does not argue on behalf of the
idea of confederation. So, while it is helpful to suppose that the critics are
agitated by Thomas's ideas as ideas (because it helps account for their fervor),
it is still not clear why they frame the debate in the terms that they do.
One possibility is that Thomas is arguing for the idea of a confederation
whether he says so or not. To me this seems doubtful or even unfair. If I were
to write in favor of one important but limited aspect of Marxism (say, the idea
of alienated labor), it would seem wrong, at least absent a good deal of
explanation, for you to reply that I am arguing on behalf of the inevitability of
class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and all the rest. Analogously,
even if Thomas likes one important component of the idea of confederation (for
example, the notion that ultimate sovereignty resides in the people in the states),
he is not necessarily committed to other possible components (such as the
lodging of citizens' primary allegiance in state governments).
A variation on this way of explaining the extreme terminology chosen by
the critics of the dissent is to focus not on the ideas that Thomas was arguing
for but on the ideas that his opinion undermines. To the extent that, as I
suggested earlier, the dissent is a sustained and impressive refutation, then its
significance for the critics could correspond to the significance of the ideas that
they see in the majority's position. The critics' terminology, that is, might be
explicable as a reflection of their own commitments. To test this explanation, it
is necessary to shift attention to the majority opinion. What aspirations does it.
stand for?

I
The majority opinion holds that at least insofar as states seek to regulate
19. The joke, of course, is that her use of the word has to be understood to be a wild
exaggeration, the verbal equivalent of a cartoon. Since just about everyone knows that
"reinstalling" the Articles of Confederation would require dismantling the national governmentthe abolition of the House of Representatives, the Presidency, the Judicial Branch (with the
exception of the maritime courts), the Bill of Rights, all regulations based on the commerce
power, and all national taxation-no one at the New York Times (or, for that matter, at the
NationalEnquirer)can believe that it is a "slight" exaggeration to attribute this program to four
members of the Supreme Court. Greenhouse thus gets all the rhetorical advantage of associating
the dissenters with the Articles of Confederation while making fun of anyone so ignorant as to
take her seriously.
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the national electoral process, they must be authorized to do so by the
Constitution. It denies that the Tenth Amendment's reservation of
unenumerated powers to the states is a sufficient authorization because that
reservation refers only to powers in existence before the Constitution was
enacted. Since the national government's electoral system was created by the
Constitution, authority to regulate it could not have existed prior to ratification.
Even if the power could have been reserved, the Court insists that it was not
because the text of the Constitution establishes an exclusive set of qualifications.
At least in my judgment, the Thomas dissent mounts an effective
challenge to these positions.2 0 But if all that it challenges is the conclusion that
state-imposed qualifications for national political office are unconstitutional, the
ardor of Thomas's critics would be hard to understand. Such qualifications have
been imposed in the past without threatening the Union, 21 and even the majority
acknowledges that term limits are arguably beneficial. 2 2 Moreover, other
qualifications that could be imagined (such as mental competency) seem sensible
enough. It might be thought, therefore, that the majority's position must entail
much more. For example, there presumably are many national functions
besides elections that came into being only with the Constitution of 1787. The
concurring opinion, accordingly, implies that states have no reserved power to
regulate any exercise of federal power. 23 From this it might be extrapolated
that states have no power under the Tenth Amendment to regulate substantive
areas that are enumerated in the Constitution as being national powers.2 4 The
argument would be that national powers like that over commerce came into
being with the Constitution of 1787 in the same way that the national electoral
process did; therefore, the states could not have exercised this precise power
prior to ratification. The conclusion would follow that there is no concurrent
state authority over matters subject to congressional power, such as the power
to regulate commerce.
Some people might consider the logic of these extensions to be very
powerful. In fact, the logic is almost a perfect reflection of the objections that
Justice Brennan, as well as various eminent law professors, made to National
League of Cities years ago.25 Like the state's putatively sovereign apparatus, the
sovereign national political process can be thought to be significant ultimately
because of the substantive regulatory decisions that it yields. Therefore (so goes
the argument), it follows a fortiori from Term Limits that states can exercise
no power over the regulation of commerce.
Of course, for the general reasons that I mentioned in connection with
possible extensions of Thomas's own position, these kinds of extrapolations of
20. For another, similar assessment, see Sullivan, supra note 7.
21. Immediately after ratification a few states imposed qualifications, including a
property qualification and several residency qualifications. 115 S. Ct. at 1903 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
22. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1871.
23. Id. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
24. See Sullivan, supra note 7 at 98.
25. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 858 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See Frank Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of

'Sovereignty' in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Laurence

Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalismand Affirmative Rights to
EssentialGovernment Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977).
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the majority position are hardly inevitable even if the logic were inexorable.
For one thing, the consequences would be impractical. The exercise of federal
authority is as pervasive as the delivery of mail and could hardly be immunized
from all state regulation.26 Moreover, now that "commerce" is thought to
include almost all activities that go on within the states, abolishing or limiting
the states' concurrent powers would require increasing Washington's regulatory
power at a time of widespread disenchantment with centralized planning.
Although versions of these doctrinal implications have been toyed with at
various times, beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824, it seems fanciful to
attribute to the Term Limits majority any serious intentions of these kinds.
Even the more limited extrapolation-that is, to the establishment of an
immunity for the exercise of certain "sovereign" national functions-would run
up against the Court's frustrating experience in trying to define the sovereign
functions of state governments. Having not so long ago acknowledged the
morass created by these efforts, 27 it would be strange for the Court to embark
on the same inquiry at the national level.
The probability that the Term Limits majority is not intending to initiate
any broad regime of federal immunity does not mean that it does not find the
idea conceptually attractive. After all, those Justices do quote approvingly from
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland-an opinion that
contains language expansive enough that it would, if taken literally, prevent
states from requiring U.S. mail trucks to stop at red lights. 28 Moreover,
members of the Term Limits majority have joined in decisions of the Court that
have invalidated state laws that, even in the absence of a federal statute, are said
to burden interstate commerce unduly.29 These "dormant Commerce Clause"
cases demonstrate the continuing appeal of the idea that an authorization to
Congress is inconsistent with concurrent state regulatory power.
Historically, and for some today, this appeal might rest in part on an
analogy to physical objects. That is, national regulatory authorization might be
thought to occupy space in the same way that a cinder block does and, thus, to
exclude any other government's powers. However, the modern dormant
commerce cases tend to be highly functional rather than conceptualistic-they
26. For a revealing description, see Gerald F. Seib, FederalSystem: You Can Get Away
from Washington-ButNot Government, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at Al.
27. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
28.
The Court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The
result is a conviction that the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to
retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested
in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that

supremacy which the constitution has declared.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436 (1819).
29. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994) (opinion of
Court by Stevens, which was joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg); C&A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994) (opinion of the Court by
Kennedy, joined inter alia by Stevens and Ginsburg, with O'Connor concurring). Justice
Stevens, the author of the majority opinion in Term Limits has had a long history of aggressively
enforcing "dormant" Commerce Clause principles. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662
(1981), cert. dismissed sub nom., Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 455 U.S. 329
(1982); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
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emphasize interest balancing and motive analysis rather than abstractions about
the allocation of power. In fact, one of the ideas that they seem to reflect is
almost the opposite of the cinder block analogy. In some of these cases what
state officials seem to have done wrong is to have not regulated interstate
commerce (or at least to have not been sufficiently attentive to the needs of that
commerce). 30 Rather than being ready to shoulder an appropriate share of the
costs of national commerce, they have tried to protect their own citizens'
interests by sloughing off burdens onto other states.
It is possible, then, that the federal immunity created in Term Limits
arises out of a commitment to the much larger idea that local ties and loyalties
that exist within the states are dangerous because they produce policies that
frustrate national policies. This may sound too self-evident to be worth
mentioning, but notice something: This formulation turns federalism on its
head. A principal reason for a federal system, obviously, is to allow for the
vindication of local interests and values. 31 Another is to divide citizen loyalty so
that political competition between the nation and the states can help enforce
constitutional limitations on the central government. 32 That is, the system is
built on the idea that, at least within limits, the national will should be
frustrated by state-based politics. If the Term Limits majority is committed to
the idea that local interests and divided loyalties are undesirable just because
they can reflect different values and interests than those that prevail at the
national level, it is opposed to federalism. 33
Since virtually everyone agrees that federalism is a basic element of our
constitutional system, I do not want to be hasty in attributing to five members
of the Supreme Court a position that is profoundly hostile to that principle.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, radical as it would be, such hostility
would explain the terminology utilized by the five prevailing Justices.
Remember, the majority suggests they are doing battle with the position that
this nation is "a collection of states" and that Congress is a "confederation of
nations"; recall also that the concurrence attacks the view that "the sole political
identity of an American is with the State of his or her residence." These
formulations cast the issue as being between unified nationhood and
confederation, between loyalty to the whole country and loyalty to a state. They
leave out the possibility that multiple sovereignties and divided loyalties can be
consistent with nationhood. They leave out, that is, the possibility of federalism.
Still, each of the specific sentences I have quoted could in context be read
as having a meaning that stops well short of general hostility to the basic
elements of federalism. Other aspects of the Term Limits opinion, however,
support the conclusion that a radically nationalistic aspiration animates the
majority.

30.
31.
32.

See, e.g., Kassel, 450 U.S. at 662.
See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 1, at 929.

See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1436

(1987); Robert F. Nagel, Federalismas a FundamentalValue: National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REV., 99-100 (1981).
33. Or, to put the matter more abstractly, the majority opinion strains against the
fundamental demand imposed by the idea of federalism-the demand that citizens "operate
mentally on more than one track." See Wilfred M. McClay, The Soul ofMan Under Federalism,
FIRST THINGS, June-July 1996, at 21, 25.
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Consider how far the majority takes the argument that the power to
define qualifications for national office is a new, non-reserved power created
by the whole people when the Constitution was ratified. It is one thing to accept
(as the Court does) Justice Story's claim that national officers "owe their
34
existence and functions to the united voice of the whole...of the people." If
historically true, this claim would tend to support the rather. formalistic
conclusion that the power to determine qualifications could not have predated
ratification. The majority, however, takes another step altogether and endorses
the view that national representatives "owe primary allegiance...to the people of
the Nation." 35 This assertion is unnecessary to the Court's Tenth Amendment
argument because that argument turns on the metaphysics of "reserving"
powers. Even if it were entirely clear that the power to set qualifications came
it
into being with the new Constitution, the framers might have thought 36
desirable or inevitable that primary loyalty would remain with the states.
They did, after all, set up a system that as a practical matter leaves the people in
each state free to vote for representatives whose predominant allegiance is to
their state.37 Nevertheless, the majority pushes the point further, insisting that
the "salary provisions reflect the view that representatives owe their allegiance
to the people, and not to the States." 38 Here the majority does not modify
"allegiance" with the word "primary" and thus appears to have extended its
disapproval of divided loyalties so far as to insist on a single allegiance.
There can be doubt, of course, about whether the majority means to go
this far. This stance is inconsistent with the position taken by the Court only
eleven years ago that the national political process can and should be trusted to
guard the role of the statis in our federal system. 39 More fundamentally, it is
inconsistent with the great insight of the founders that it is possible-and
desirable-to have multiple sovereigns, that loyalty to the national government
can coexist with, and even be partially defined by, loyalty to state governments.
The concluding paragraph of the opinion, however, tends to dispel any
doubts. 4o To permit state-imposed term limits, the majority says, "would effect
a fundamental change in the constitutional framework." The framers intended
the qualifications for national representatives to be "fixed" and "uniform." That
intention, says the Supreme Court, reflects the understanding that "Members of
Congress...become, when elected, servants of the people of the United States."
Thus, the theory at work in Term Limits is that the whole people of the United
States have a legal interest in each state's representatives because the duty of
those officers is to pursue the political interests of the nation. Their allegiance
must be to the national interest. Again, what is left out of this version of our
"constitutional framework" is the possibility that state interests may legitimately
help to define the national interest. What is left out is the framers' paradoxical
34. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1855 (1995).
35. Id.
36. See Robert F. Nagel, The Last CentrifugalForce, 12 CONST. COMM. 187 (1995).
37. It is true that Article VI, paragraph 3 requires that senators and representatives take an
oath "to support the Constitution." This is no practical limitation; moreover, even conceptually it
is a serious limitation only if there is agreement that state interests cannot help define what "the
Constitution" means.
38. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1855.
39. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
40. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1871.
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idea that in a federal system officials cannot properly serve one master unless
they also serve another.
In claiming that the Term Limits majority rejects the idea of federalism
itself, I might be accused of exaggerating in the same way that the critics of the
dissent exaggerated when they attributed to that opinion a commitment to
confederation. Perhaps this is true, although I have tried to stay close to the
language and arguments actually used by the majority. Moreover, while it is
unrealistic to believe that in operation the national interest is or could be
defined independently of state interests, the idea of unalloyed nationalism is not
unrealistic at all.
In fact, in various guises the concept is endemic in the legal academy
today. It can be seen, for example, in Bruce Ackerman's "constitutional
moments," which occur when the American people, unconstrained by those
inconvenient, state-based procedures in Article V, amend the Constitution by
bringing the conclusions of their heightened deliberations directly to bear on
national decision makers.4 1 Unalloyed nationalism can also be seen in Robin
West's claim that the Fourteenth Amendment embodies "an absolute,
incontrovertible right not to be subject to any sovereignty other than the
state." 42 Under West's "sole sovereignty" principle, state and local governments
are reduced to much the same status as private organizations; "the state" is the
national government, and for her it is bondage to be subject to more than this
one sovereign.
Tamer manifestations of strong nationalism can be seen in the hostility of
Daniel Farber, Mark Tushnet, William Eskridge, and Suzanna Sherry to the
malapportionment of the United States Senate, and in the criticisms that Jack
Balkin and Akhil Amar direct at the electoral college. 43 If these examples seem
partial and oblique, think of Jesse Choper's full scale assault on the values of
federalism.44 Or read Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley's colorful argument
that there is "no normative principle involved [in federalism] that is worthy of
protection." 45
To say the least, the five Justices in the Term Limits majority would not
be entirely out of step with much prominent academic thinking if they were
hostile to basic elements of federalism. Although their commitment to
nationalism is not unconventional, it is, I think, radical in the sense that it
represents a basic rejection of the constitutional design. At any rate, to the
extent that Term Limits does represent a commitment to radical nationalism,
the argumentative stakes are very high. It would be natural for those who
support the majority position to perceive the dissent's persistent rebuttal as
outrageously extreme; in fact, from the perspective of Thomas's critics the
dissent is radical because it reasserts a constitutional commitment that
contemporary nationalists have rather completely abandoned.

41.

BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).

42.

ROBIN VEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 36 (1994).

43. See ConstitutionalStupidities:A Symposium, 12 CONST. COMM. 139 (1995).
44. Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The
Dispensabilityof JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
45. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 1, at 909.
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IV
My effort so far to explain the extreme terminology spawned by the
Thomas dissent may strike you as unsatisfactory because the most I have shown
is that the dissent threatens an idea that is legalistically radical. Given the loud
cheers that sophisticated commentators have often raised when the modem
Court has done "justice" by departing from the intended meaning of the
Constitution, it would be naive in the extreme to assume that journalists or even
most Justices think it crucial to adhere closely to text or original understanding.
It is more likely that Thomas's critics simply believe that there is no'good
political or organizational reason to dilute national political allegiance and
national political will. As I have already indicated, a substantial literature exists
arguing in that direction. Unless Thomas's position undermines the conviction
that unalloyed nationalism is a desirable system, it remains difficult to see how
his dissent could seriously threaten his critics.
One extra legal reason for the kind of nationalism represented by the
majority opinion is the belief that federalism is out of date. For instance, Rubin
and Feeley argue that federalism can no longer secure state-based values and
identifications because today "our real community is a national one." 46 No
doubt there is much to support this claim empirically, and the claim itself is
powerful in its implications. For one thing, if the kind of unalloyed nationalism
embraced by the Term Limits majority is already a completely established fact,
then the dissenters' ideas are radically at odds with our circumstances.
The term limits movement, however, presents a discomforting fact for
empiricists like Rubin and Feeley. This movement, based in the states and
springing in part from local experience with the imposition of qualifications for
state legislative offices, is evidence that our political community is not yet
completely nationalized. Indeed, it demonstrates that people within some states
are ready to challenge national political elites both intellectually and politically.
The dissent emphasizes this when it depicts that initiative as "an effort at the
state level to offset the electoral advantages that congressional incumbents have
conferred upon themselves at the federal level." 47 Thomas's constitutional
defense thus carries with it a much larger point about the continuing role of
46. Id. For people who have actually lived in local communities (as opposed to flying
over them), much of Rubin and Feeley's depiction will be a hoot. The professors say, for
instance, "Most of our states.. .are mere administrative units, rectangular swatches of the prairie
with nothing but their legal definitions to distinguish them from one another." Id. at 944. This
sort of assertion demonstrates less about the nature of local political communities than about the
disabilities that afflict some very smart people: "Like a foreigner or a man out of his social class,
[the rationalist] is bewildered by a tradition.. .of which he knows only the surface.... And he
conceives a contempt for what he does not understand." MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, RATIONALISM
IN POLITICS

31 (1962). That Rubin and Feeley should describe those who disagree with their
depiction as "neurotic" is not some insignificant rhetorical flourish. The professional, managerial
class that identifies so strongly with national political institutions has long viewed mainstream
Americans as "inmates of an insane asylum." See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY
HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS, 447 passim (1991). See also ROBERT H. WEIBE,
SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 221 (1995).
47.

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1912 (1995). Felix Morley

made the general point that in an unchecked national democracy "the top echelons begin to regard
themselves as a managerial elite, entitled to rule the rest of the county...." FELIX MORLEY,
FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM 28 (Liberty ed. 1981). "That centralizing process," he said, "is
difficult to reverse because of the vested interest in power...." Id. at 5.
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state-based politics in shaping the national culture.48
The intellectual tradition of which Term Limits is a part does not always
insist that our only real political community is national. Indeed, an
alternative-and probably more widespread-basis for modem hostility to
federalism is the belief that state-based political communities do exist but are
morally benighted. This belief is understandable in light of the unsavory
historical associations of "states' rights." It has never, however, been entirely
accurate, as is demonstrated by the commonly invoked examples of state
resistance to the Alien and Sedition Act and later to fugitive slave laws.49 More
to the point, in acknowledging that term limits can be defended as a method of
compensating for the advantages of incumbency, the dissent undermines the
moral complacency of liberal nationalists. The entrenched congressional
leadership is, after all, an odd object of solicitude for progressives. Whatever
the immediate partisan implications might be, the general stance of the term
limits movement-it proposes institutional reform, favors political flux and
accountability, and challenges the powerful-raises
a significant question about
where the progressive instinct is lodged today. 50
Even if state-based political cultures do exist and can promote morally
attractive policies, strong nationalists object to federalism because it frustrates
the will of the national majority. Thus, state-imposed term limits would, the
Court says, "be inconsistent with the Framers' vision of a uniform National
Legislature representing the people of the United States." 5' Although chosen by
separate constituents, after their election national
representatives should be
"servants of the people of the United States." 52 Majoritarianism at the state
level, in short, must not be allowed to interfere with the more important
majoritarianism that occurs in our national institutions.
The moral basis for national majoritarianism might at first appear to be
clear enough. If political legitimacy comes from electoral numbers, surely
more is better than less, bigger more legitimate than smaller. Why should a
majority in Arkansas frustrate the larger majority called "the people of the
United States"? However, as Felix Morley long ago pointed out,5 3 this logic can
be applied to national majorities too, for the world has more people than the
United States. If nationalism is not to dissolve into internationalism, it must be
that the appropriate size of the governing majority depends on many factors,
including the quality of the deliberation achievable at a particular scale, the
moral entitlement of a certain segment of the population to control issues of
special importance to them, and so on. As Thomas's dissent makes clear, once
the reflexive preference for majoritarianism in larger units is set aside, the
values of democracy might well support the results of the Arkansas initiative
process. The term limits provision had "won nearly 60% of the votes cast in a

48. For an account of how "local America" has checked the power of the "national class"
not only throughout the last century but well into this one, see WEIBE, supra note 46, at 215-37.
49.

SHAPIRO, supra note 4, at 46.

50. That is, it raises the question whether self-described "progressives" are progressive.
See generally, Robert F. Nagel, Progressand Constitutionalism,MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming
1996).
51. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct. at 1845.
52. Id. at 1871.
53. MORLEY, supra note 47, at 42-43.
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direct election and... [had] carried every congressional district in the state." The
majority of Arkansas voters had thereby decided "to restrict the field of
candidates whom they [were] willing to send to Washington....-54
There are, of course, various ways for nationalists to supplement the
first, crude argument for national majoritarianism. Rubin and Feeley's claim
that "the United States has one political community, and that political
community is the United States" is one such effort.5 5 Although their assertion
would no doubt come as a surprise to the many Americans for whom
participation in state political processes is important and distinctive, suppose
that it were true. Even if Rubin and Feeley's claim (or others serving the same
purpose) were believable, it could not be used to support the Term Limits
decision. The reason is that no national majority had prohibited states from
enacting term limits legislation. Even given the obvious incentives to do so,
Congress had passed no statute on the matter.
National democracy is an unlikely explanation for the kind of nationalism
represented by Term Limits anyway. Many nationalistic legal scholars,
including some of Thomas's critics, regard the legislative process with
skepticism and Congress with something close to contempt. Moreover, on
significant occasions, all the Justices are quite willing to countermand the
products of congressional decisionmaking. Indeed, in Term Limits itself the
majority takes the unusual step of rearguing and reaffirming one such decision,
Powell v. McCormack.5 6 This suggests that, despite the Court's rhetoric about
national representatives being "servants" of the whole people, the likely
explanation for Term Limits is actually distrust of national democracy. And, in
fact, under the majority opinion, Congress is foreclosed from either approving
or disapproving state term limits legislation. It is the dissenting opinion that
would allow for an expression of political will at the national level; it proposes
to validate the Arkansas term limits law as a regulation of federal elections
under Article I, section 4, thus presumably exposing such state laws to
congressional override S7
While it is, I think, accurate to conclude that Term Limits is not animated
by democratic impulses, it would be too much to say that the nationalism of
Term Limits is thoroughly anti-majoritarian. According to its own terms, the
decision blocks both the state and national political processes only where a clear
and certain constitutional limitation is at stake. So if there is an attractive value
behind the nationalism of Term Limits, it is the value of constitutionalism.
But how attractive is the aspiration for constitutionalism found in Term
Limits? As I noted earlier, the main constitutional arguments made by the
54. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1891. It might be added to Thomas's argument that
cynicism and withdrawal, which can characterize politics where an elite is entrenched, might
ultimately undercut the social conditions that support political participation. See MORLEY, supra
note 47, at 27 (developing the distinction between social and political democracy). To the extent
this is true, term limits can be seen as protecting democracy at both the state and national levels.
5 5. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 1, at 945.
56. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1848-52 (reaffirming Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (1969).
57. Id. at 1909-13. The dissent is not explicit on this latter point, but at a minimum it
makes clear that Congress could legislate against disqualifications that worked to prevent any
elections at all. Id. at 1900. The majority is entirely certain that the whole issue cannot be
decided by legislatures, whether state or national. Id. at 1871.
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Court and so doggedly challenged by the four dissenting Justices are: that the
power to define qualifications was not an "original power" of the states and
therefore could not have been reserved; and that even if the power had been
original, the framers "divested" the states by listing exclusive qualifications.
The effect of the majority's arguments on both issues is that the Constitution
authoritatively covers the issue of state-imposed term limits. It is authoritative
with respect to the first issue because the "reserved powers" are a closed set,
determined by what existed at the time of ratification. It is authoritative with
respect to the second issue because the qualifications listed in the Constitution
were meant to be exhaustive even as against state augmentation.
Correspondingly, the specific meaning of the dissent is that both the
reserved powers and the possible qualifications for Congress are open sets. The
resonance of this argument goes much beyond the issue of term limits. Its
larger significance is the idea that the Constitution leaves important gaps and,
thus, that there are dangerous possibilities it cannot protect against. The
dissenters' position, that is, insists that there are limits to constitutional control
over politics-that beyond the lighted arena of constitutional interpretation lies
an unbounded world of political will.
This prospect is radical. It cuts against the over-arching promise of
modem constitutionalism, which is that a minimal level of political virtue can
be assured by legal prescription. The power of this promise can be seen in the
ever-expanding list of subjects that in this century have been exposed to judicial
oversight. 5 8 The promise does not require that constitutional protections be
defined at any definite level. It requires that the Constitution cover as much as
possible so that as little as possible will be excluded from legal constraint (and
its operational correlative, judicial supervision). For many, this idea of
exhaustive constitutionalism makes possible a profound sense of security and
assurance.
The dissent's willingness to challenge this promise, I think, is what makes
explicable the cries of outrage. Seen in this light, the critics' references to
reconstruction and confederation are allusions to the degree of political chaos
that unsupervised political will can generate. It also explains the otherwise
perplexing theme that I mentioned at the outset. As I said, both the majority and
the dissent treat as central to the case the issue of consent-whether the people
of the states or the undifferentiated people of the nation consented to the
Constitution. The dissent's claim that sovereignty lies in the people of the states
is troubling not because it bears very much on the scope of the Tenth
Amendment, but because it is emblematic of forces not subject to constitutional
control. On the other hand, the majority's repeated invocation of the "people of
the whole nation" comfortingly projects the idea of a nationhood back into the
pre-constitutional past. At the same time, it extends the metaphor of legal
control by suggesting that the only cognizable political force that pre-dated the
nation was the "whole people" who constrained themselves forevermore when
they consented to the Constitution. Under this view, ultimately there is no
legitimate political force outside the Constitution.
For the Term Limits majority, then, the trouble with federalism turns
58. See generally Robert F. Nagel, PoliticalLaw, LegalisticPolitics:A Recent History of
the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine,56 U. CHi. L. REv. 643 (1989).
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out to be the same thing that is the trouble with democracy. Both mean that the
Constitution leaves much unresolved. 59 Both destroy the background assurance
that things will come out all right.
An aspiration for control by legal prescription is what drives modem
constitutionalism and its derivative, radical nationalism. This aspiration is a
profound part of our political culture (and especially the culture of the legal
elite) but it is shaky because in sober moments everyone knows that uncertainty
and risk are elementary facts of political life that cannot be expunged by a
written code or judicial review. The Term Limits dissent thus struck an
exposed nerve with its unblinking insistence that the possibility of unprescribed
outcomes is also perfectly legitimate.

5 9. As Wilfred M. McClay has written, "IThere is in federalism a recognition of a kind
of restlessness and mystery and indecisiveness at the heart of American political life--as if many
of the most important questions remain open and unsettled." McClay, supranote 33, at 25.

